2022 AMOS Event Summary Report

This report summarizes the 2022 AMOS Dialogue, a closed-door, Chatham House Rule workshop that convened global stakeholders to discuss the role of space situational awareness (SSA) in future space security verification regimes.

The event focused on how SSA could support verification mechanisms for potential space arms control agreements, examining both its technical utility and political limitations. Key insights included:

• SSA excels at identifying visible, physical threats, such as debris-generating ASAT tests or proximity operations. It is less effective for threats like cyber attacks or electronic warfare, which require complementary analysis.
• Verification must integrate purpose, participation, practices, and penalties—a framework drawn from arms control verification models.
• Multilateral verification regimes (like the CTBTO) offer a useful model for space, especially given the reliance on data from primarily Western sources. Broadening data provenance was identified as essential for credibility.
• Analytical capacity is critical: SSA is not enough on its own. The data must be interpreted through trusted frameworks capable of assigning meaning and intent.
• Commercial SSA providers play a growing role in data gathering and interpretation—but their involvement in arms control verification raises normative and legal questions about liability and targeting.
• Participants stressed that verification is not just about detecting violations—but also about building trust, shaping behavior, and establishing shared expectations of conduct in space.

The Dialogue also addressed key takeaways from the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, with discussion on how SSA could verify concepts such as no destructive ASAT testing, transparency in RPOs, and the identification of dual-use activities.

See discussion of “Four Ps of Verification” and multilateral treaty models on pp. 1–2.

Event held under Chatham House Rule to encourage candid, cross-sector dialogue.

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