Reports

The Portuguese translation of Responsible Investment in the Space Sector, which explains how stewardship, risk management, and responsible behavior in space operations protect long-term value in the growing space economy.

China’s “reusable experimental spacecraft” (Chongfu Shiyong Shiyan Hangtian Qi, or CSSHQ) is a technology demonstrator and experimental vehicle which is likely used for testing reusable space launch vehicle technologies, as well as on-orbit testing of new sensor technologies and satellite hardware for risk reduction. The CSSHQ has deployed a small satellite during each of its first three missions. It has demonstrated limited rendezvous and proximity operations with the satellites that it has released during its missions, but the spaceplane has near-zero feasibility as an orbital weapons system for attacking targets on the ground.

Since 2010, Russia has been testing technologies for rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) that could lead to or support a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, and some of those efforts have links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program. Additional evidence suggests Russia may have started a new co-orbital ASAT program called Burevestnik, potentially supported by a surveillance and tracking program called Nivelir. The technologies developed by these programs could also be used for non-aggressive applications, including surveilling and inspecting foreign satellites, and most of the on-orbit RPO activities done to date match these missions. However, Russia has deployed two “sub-satellites” at high velocity, which suggests at least some of their LEO RPO activities are of a weapons nature.

Over the last decade, India has shifted from a purely civil space program to one that includes military capabilities.

Since 2008, China has conducted multiple tests of satellite technologies for robotic rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) to support surveillance and inspection of other space objects in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), most of which are related to military or intelligence operations. While these missions have been publicly acknowledged by China, most have few public details and a few remain shrouded in secrecy. None of the programs listed here have strong evidence to link them to co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) testing or deployment.

China has at least one, and possibly as many as three, programs underway to develop direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) capabilities, either as dedicated counterspace systems or as midcourse missile defense systems that could also provide counterspace capabilities. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against LEO targets is likely mature and potentially operationally fielded on mobile launchers. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against deep space targets (MEO and GEO) is likely still in the experimental or development phase, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether it will become an operational capability in the near future. Since 2005, China has conducted over a dozen tests of DA-ASAT capabilities, although only one, conducted on January 11, 2007, resulted in the creation of long-lived orbital debris.