Publications

The Portuguese translation of Responsible Investment in the Space Sector, which explains how stewardship, risk management, and responsible behavior in space operations protect long-term value in the growing space economy.

China’s “reusable experimental spacecraft” (Chongfu Shiyong Shiyan Hangtian Qi, or CSSHQ) is a technology demonstrator and experimental vehicle which is likely used for testing reusable space launch vehicle technologies, as well as on-orbit testing of new sensor technologies and satellite hardware for risk reduction. The CSSHQ has deployed a small satellite during each of its first three missions. It has demonstrated limited rendezvous and proximity operations with the satellites that it has released during its missions, but the spaceplane has near-zero feasibility as an orbital weapons system for attacking targets on the ground.

Since 2010, Russia has been testing technologies for rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) that could lead to or support a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, and some of those efforts have links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program. Additional evidence suggests Russia may have started a new co-orbital ASAT program called Burevestnik, potentially supported by a surveillance and tracking program called Nivelir. The technologies developed by these programs could also be used for non-aggressive applications, including surveilling and inspecting foreign satellites, and most of the on-orbit RPO activities done to date match these missions. However, Russia has deployed two “sub-satellites” at high velocity, which suggests at least some of their LEO RPO activities are of a weapons nature.

Over the last decade, India has shifted from a purely civil space program to one that includes military capabilities.

Since 2008, China has conducted multiple tests of satellite technologies for robotic rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) to support surveillance and inspection of other space objects in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), most of which are related to military or intelligence operations. While these missions have been publicly acknowledged by China, most have few public details and a few remain shrouded in secrecy. None of the programs listed here have strong evidence to link them to co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) testing or deployment.

China has at least one, and possibly as many as three, programs underway to develop direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) capabilities, either as dedicated counterspace systems or as midcourse missile defense systems that could also provide counterspace capabilities. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against LEO targets is likely mature and potentially operationally fielded on mobile launchers. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against deep space targets (MEO and GEO) is likely still in the experimental or development phase, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether it will become an operational capability in the near future. Since 2005, China has conducted over a dozen tests of DA-ASAT capabilities, although only one, conducted on January 11, 2007, resulted in the creation of long-lived orbital debris.

Since 2013, Russia has conducted robotic rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), most of which are related to military or intelligence operations. Most of these missions have been publicly acknowledged by the Russian government but few have detailed public information available. None of the programs listed here are thought to involve co-orbital ASAT testing or deployment, but there are still suspicions surrounding several of these events and concerns that some of these programs are intended to develop co-orbital counterspace capabilities.

Russia has long had the potential for a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) capability through its historical ballistic missile defense capabilities and has had DA-ASAT development programs in the past that never became fully operational. In November 2021, after more than a decade of development and testing, Russia successfully demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite. It is unclear whether this system, the Nudol, will become operational soon, and it does not appear to have the capability to threaten targets beyond LEO. Russia is thought to have two other possible DA-ASAT capabilities through 78M6 Kontakt: a Cold War-era air-launched ballistic missile that was designed to be launched from a fighter plane and was rumored to be in active development again; and S-500: a next-generation exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense system, still several years from deployment, that may have capabilities against targets in low LEO orbits.

While the United States does not have an operational, acknowledged direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) system, it does have operational midcourse missile defense interceptors, one of which has been demonstrated in an ASAT role against a satellite in a very low orbit. The United States has developed dedicated DA-ASATs in the past, both conventional and nuclear-tipped, and likely possesses the ability to do so in the near future should it choose so.

The United States conducted one co-orbital intercept test in 1986 with the Delta 180 experiment as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The United States has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and rendezvous in both low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Orbit (GEO), along with tracking, targeting, and hit-to-kill (HTK) intercept technologies that could lead to a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. These tests and demonstrations were conducted for other non-offensive missions, such as missile defense, on-orbit inspections, and satellite servicing, and the United States does not have an acknowledged program to develop co-orbital capabilities. However, the United States possesses the technological capability to develop a co-orbital capability in a short period of time if it chooses to. If the United States moves ahead with its planned Golden Dome missile defense architecture, the space-based interceptors that would be part of such a program could provide a co-orbital capability.

This fact sheet outlines U.S. military and intelligence use of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in Earth orbit for surveillance, inspection, and situational awareness missions—without direct evidence of weaponization.

Interest in orbital data centers has moved quickly from the margins to a major trend in space development. Companies including SpaceX, Blue Origin, Starcloud, Google, Planet, Nvidia, and others have announced plans or interest in using on-orbit satellite constellations to meet growing demand for artificial intelligence and other compute-intensive applications. In this month’s Insight piece, SWF’s Alex Shi and Ian Christensen examine what these proposals could mean for space operations, safety, sustainability, and the regulatory systems now being asked to review them.

Secure World Foundation’s filing on Blue Origin’s orbital data center application urges the FCC to treat the proposal as a precedent-setting request that needs closer scrutiny. The filing calls for system-level risk analysis, phased authorization, and updated standards for evaluating very large satellite constellations.

A visual overview of space sustainability, highlighting how satellites support modern life, the growing challenges of debris and congestion, and the policy and technical measures needed to preserve the orbital environment.

This insight piece highlights major findings from Secure World Foundation’s 2026 Global Counterspace Capabilities report, which tracks how 13 countries are developing capabilities to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy space systems. It matters because it gives policymakers and other stakeholders a clearer public picture of a fast-changing area of space security.

Secure World Foundation’s filing on Starcloud’s orbital data center application urges the FCC to treat the proposal as a precedent-setting request that needs closer scrutiny. The filing calls for system-level risk analysis, phased authorization, and updated standards for evaluating very large satellite constellations.

The 2026 report reveals growing global counterspace capabilities and urges public awareness of the risks of space conflict.

In this episode, Dr. Masami Onoda of JAXA discusses Japan’s approach to growing the space economy through public-private partnership, sustainability, and international cooperation. The conversation covers the Space Strategy Fund, debris removal, industrial policy, and the governance challenges shaping the future of space activity.