Chinese Direct Ascent Anti-satellite Testing Fact Sheet

Summary

Since 2008, China has conducted multiple tests of satellite technologies for robotic rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) to support surveillance and inspection of other space objects in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), most of which are related to military or intelligence operations. While these missions have been publicly acknowledged by China, most have few public details and a few remain shrouded in secrecy. None of the programs listed here have strong evidence to link them to co-orbital ASAT testing or deployment.

Rendezvous & Proximity Operations

Proximity operations are a series of orbital maneuvers executed to place and maintain a spacecraft in the vicinity of another space object on a relative planned path for a specific time duration to accomplish mission objectives. Rendezvous is a process whereby two space objects, artificial or natural bodies, are intentionally brought close together through a series of orbital maneuvers at a planned time and place. Taken together, RPO technologies enable a wide range of capabilities to support civil and commercial space activities such as on-orbit inspections, repair, refueling, assembly, and life extension. RPO capabilities can also be used for military and intelligence space activities such as intelligence, surveillance, and offensive weapons such as co-orbital anti-satellites. Since the late 2000s, China has conducted a series of robotic on-orbit demonstrations between different sets of satellites.

Chinese Military and Intelligence RPO Missions in LEO

The first known Chinese robotic RPO occurred in September 2008 when a Chinese human spaceflight mission Shenzhou 7 deployed a small satellite to practice on-orbit inspection and control system flying capabilities.¹ Some observers concluded that the BX-1 was a test of the capabilities required for a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) attack² but the mission has not been linked to any such military program.³

In the summer of 2010, the Chinese satellites Shi Jian (SJ)-12 and SJ-06F conducted a series of robotic RPO.⁴ The mission of SJ-12, as stated by the State media service Xinhua, is to carry out “scientific and technological experiments.”⁵ In the summer of 2010, the SJ-12 initiated a series of deliberate changes in its orbital trajectory to approach and rendezvous with the SJ-06F satellite.⁶ The maneuvers occurred over several weeks between June 12, 2010, and August 16, 2010. On August 19, the two satellites came within 300 meters. A change in the orbital trajectory for the SJ-06F around that same time indicates that the two satellites may have bumped into each other, although there were no external indications of damage to either satellite or any debris created by the incident.

On July 19, 2013, China placed three payloads into roughly similar LEO orbits from the same launch — Shiyan 7 (SY-7), Chuangxin 3 (CX-3), and Shijian 15 (SJ-15).⁷ The SY-7 carried a teleoperated robotic arm while the SJ-15 was equipped with RPO capabilities. In August 2013, SJ-15 conducted an RPO of CX-3 within a few kilometers and another RPO with Shi Jian 7 (SJ-7), a Chinese satellite launched in 2005.⁸ Anonymous U.S. officials claimed that the RPO was part of a “covert anti-satellite weapons development program,” and that one of the satellites “grabbed” another,⁹ although the satellite with the arm, SY-7, was not involved. On October 18, 2013, the SY-7 initiated a small maneuver to raise its orbit by several hundred meters and shortly thereafter released another object, Payload A, which orbited in relatively close proximity for several days. Some reports claimed the two objects may have physically joined with each other,¹⁰ but the publicly available tracking was not accurate enough to confirm. Both objects occasionally conducted small maneuvers throughout 2014 and 2015, and the SJ-15 through 2016 as well.¹¹

In April 2014, the SJ-15 began another series of small maneuvers to conduct proximity operations around the CX-3. Between April 12-14, the SJ-15 raised its orbit by several tens of kilometers, and then between May 12 and 14, Payload C lowered its orbit by several tens of kilometers. The effect of these maneuvers was to match orbital planes once again with the SJ-7, and on a trajectory that brought it above and then behind the SJ-7 at a range of around 150 km, with a vertical separation of a few kilometers.¹² Throughout the rest of May, the SJ-15 slowly decreased the distance to the SJ-7 to within a kilometer.¹³ The SJ-15 continued to occasionally make changes to its orbit in 2015 and 2016, but the reasons for doing so were unclear. On May 6, 2016, the SJ-15 changed its altitude by several tens of kilometers, bringing it close to the CX-3 again.¹⁴

In 2016, another Chinese satellite was launched that again created concerns about on-orbit grappling. The Aolong-1, also known as the Advanced Debris Removal Vehicle (ADRV) or “Roaming Dragon,” was a small satellite developed by Harbin Institute of Technology under contract to the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) to reportedly demonstrate using a robotic arm to capture a small piece of space debris for removal from orbit. Aolong-1 was placed into orbit on the first launch of China’s new Long March 7 (LM-7) rocket on June 25, 2016, from Wenchang Space Launch Center, along with a scaled-down test version of China’s next human spacecraft, a ballast mass, and a few small rideshare cubesats. The purpose of the launch was to demonstrate the ability of the LM-7 and its restartable upper stage to place the new crewed spacecraft into orbit, to deploy multiple payloads into different orbits, test the new Tianyuan-1 refueling system developed by the National University of Defense Technology, and test the atmospheric re-entry of the crewed spacecraft test vehicle.¹⁵ Although they were only small parts of the mission, the debris removal and refueling experiments generated significant press outside of China due to concerns over dual-use technology and China leaping ahead in technology. The reality of either the Aolong-1 or the refueling experiment was less than the media hype. By all appearances, the Tianyuan-1 refueling system was attached to the upper stage, as no separate satellite of that description was ever catalogued by the U.S. military, nor did any of the ten objects catalogued in space rendezvous with any other satellites. According to U.S. military tracking data, the Aolong-1 did indeed separate into a 380 km by 200 km orbit but did not rendezvous with any other objects. The debris capture experiment appears to have been simulated, and the Aolong-1 does not appear to have altered its orbit during its short two months on orbit.¹⁶

On December 25, 2023, a Long March 11 (CZ-11) launched three satellites from a barge launch pad near Guangdong.¹⁷ The three satellites - Shiyan-24C satellites (SY-24C 01, SY-24C 02, SY-24C 03) - were inserted into a Sun-synchronous orbit inclined at 97.3 degrees (at an altitude of 540 x 553 x 540 km). Their orbit was co-planar with SJ-6 05A and SJ-6 05B, two satellites launched on October 12, 2021, via a Long March 4B (CZ 4B) launch vehicle from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.¹⁸ According to a USSF fact sheet, the five satellites started conducting RPOs from mid-March 2024 through the end of April 2024, at times separated by less than 1km and undertaking “two simultaneous proximity events at the same time.” In September 2024, SY-24C 02 and SY-24C 03 conducted three separate approaches, again under 1km, with two being multi-day actions.¹⁹ The following December, in another multi-day event, SY-24C 03 and SJ6 5A came within “tens of meters” of each other five different times and with “associated relative velocities less than 10 cm/s.”²⁰ After that, the five satellites maneuvered to maintain a separation of over 100 km.²¹

Chinese Military and Intelligence RPO Missions in GEO

China has also conducted robotic RPO demonstrations in GEO. On November 3, 2016, China placed the SJ-17 satellite in GEO, which was publicly declared to be designed to test advanced technologies.²² Several days after reaching GEO, the SJ-17 began maneuvering to place itself into the active GEO belt close to another Chinese satellite, Chinasat 5A, at a longitude of 162.9 E.²³ The SJ-17 made several small maneuvers to circumnavigate Chinasat 5A at a distance of between 50 to 100 km for several days, slowly closing in to within a few km on November 30, before returning to a 50 to 100 km standoff distance.²⁴ The two satellites remained close until December 29, when Analytical Graphics, Inc, (AGI) reported that Chinasat 5A was drifting away.²⁵

The SJ-17 drifted eastward then sharply westward until March 2018, when it lowered its orbit to reverse its drift. This indicated it conducted a survey of the GEO region. Over the first half of 2018, the SJ-17 made further unusual changes to its orbit. SJ-17’s reversal in inclination and maneuvering to a drift orbit between January and July of 2018 appears to be linked to an unexplained anomaly in the orbital trajectory of Chinasat 1C, a Chinese communications satellite launched in December 2015.²⁶ This sudden, large change in inclination suggests the SJ-17 possesses a significant delta-v capability. SJ-17 rendezvoused with Chinasat 1C, coming within 1.5 km on July 29. Ten days later, Chinasat 1C halted its drift and slowly drifted back to its operational location. SJ-17 remained with Chinasat 1C until August prior to departing, while Chinasat 1C arrived back at its original location on September 7. This strongly suggests that SJ-17 inspected Chinasat 1C to determine the source of the anomaly and monitor the recovery attempt.

Additionally, in January and October 2020, SJ-17 made smaller changes to RPO with Chinasat 6B and SJ-20. SJ-17 started drifting eastward in February 2023; in November 2023, SJ-17 spent a brief period next to VENESAT-1, a Venezuelan communications satellite built by China and launched in 2008. SJ-17 continued to move, changing its altitude six times in the process (five times taking it below the GEO belt); it dropped its altitude by 76.2 km to move below the GEO belt on Nov. 1, 2024 and then increased its altitude by 76.2 km to rejoin the GEO belt on Nov. 14.²⁸ It officially entered the Western hemisphere on Nov. 20, 2024 and appears to be stable at 178 degrees West longitude, with the nearest operational satellite being Russia’s YAMAL 300K.²⁹

On December 23, 2018, China launched another mission to GEO that also exhibited unusual behavior. Like its predecessors, the Tongxin Jishu Shiyan (TJS)-3 satellite was launched from Xichang Space Launch Center into an elliptical geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). Chinese official media has described them as communications technology test satellites but observers believe they may also be testing missile warning sensors, deployable antennas, or other technology.³⁰ TJS-3 appeared to be similar in nature, and the U.S. military ended up cataloging two objects from the launch in GEO: the TJS-3 satellite and a second object (object 43917) that was assumed to be an apogee kick motor (AKM), a detachable rocket engine often used to circularize a satellite in GEO, as it was slowly drifting westward. However, shortly after the separation, object 43917 did a series of maneuvers to place it into a GEO slot at 59.07E, near TJS-3.³¹ Object 43917 slowly drifted toward TJS-3 and, according to AGI, exhibited photometry consistent with a stabilized object, indicating it was a functional satellite and not an AKM.³²

Since May 2019, TJS-3 has circled the GEO belt and remained relatively close (within a couple of hundred kilometers) to multiple satellites, including USA 263 in July 2019 and USA 233 in March 2021 and October 2022. Given that distance, this activity is not technically a RPO but is still likely to generate concerns. TJS-3 moved into 173.5 degrees east longitude in May 2023. Another Chinese satellite, TJS-10, was launched on November 3, 2023, on a Long March 7A from Wenchang Satellite Launch Center; Chinese state media said it was intended to be “mainly used for multi-band and high-speed communication technology experiments.”³³ By November 9, it had circularized its orbit and settled into GEO at 173.3 degrees east longitude. TJS-10 and TJS-3 spent about a year undertaking coordinated maneuvers in close proximity to each other (under 50 km) as they kept synchronized orbits with very similar inclination.³⁴ In November 2024, TJS-3 separated from TJS-10 in order to move around the GEO belt.³⁵ TJS-3 continued to move until reaching 148.7 degrees East in January 2025.³⁶ The satellite subsequently reduced altitude by 53 km to stop its westward drift and was placed back on the GEO belt at 148.23 degrees East with minimal drift.³⁷

On October 24, 2021, China launched a classified satellite from the Xichang satellite launch center that it claimed was for a space debris mitigation mission.³⁸ The satellite, publicly named SJ-21, was placed into an initial GTO.  By November 2, the SJ-21 used an apogee kick motor to circularize its orbit at about 156E and bring the inclination down to 8°, releasing the AKM as a piece of debris afterward. For a while, SJ-21 maintained close proximity to the AKM, which suggested it was conducting an RPO.³⁹

On December 25, 2021, the SJ-21 rendezvoused with a defunct Chinese navigation satellite, Compass G2. The Compass G2 was a second-generation navigation satellite launched in 2009 as part of China’s Beidou constellation and appeared to fail early in its orbital lifetime as it lost station keeping and began to drift both east-west and increase in inclination. Compass G2 also experienced a fragmentation event in 2016 that released at least six trackable pieces of debris.⁴⁰ While maintaining tight proximity to Compass G2 for several weeks, the SJ-21 docked to it at some point and then around January 21, 2022, used its onboard propulsion to pull both satellites to a higher altitude above the geostationary belt. By January 27, 2022, both objects were in an elliptical orbit ranging from 290 km to 3,100 km above the protected GEO zone, as observed by commercial trackers.⁴¹ Shortly thereafter, SJ-21 reduced its orbital altitude back down to close to GEO.

On December 23, 2021, China launched a pair of satellites into GEO orbit as part of the Shiyan series, officially labeled Shiyan (SY)-12 01 and Shiyan (SY)-12 02.⁴² The two satellites remained relatively close to each other in GEO, indicating that they had maneuvering capability and may have been conducting RPO. In late January 2022, USA 270 maneuvered to approach SY-12 01 and SY-12 02. According to tracking data collected by ExoAnalytic Solutions, SY-12 01 and SY-12 02 made significant maneuvers to split up and begin rotating around the GEO belt in opposite directions, with SY-12 02 apparently also getting an imaging opportunity on USA 270.⁴³

On January 8, 2023, China launched a satellite identified as SJ-23 into a GTO. China state media described the satellite as being used for “scientific experiments and technical verification” but provided no further details.⁴⁴ Around January 15, the SJ-23 appeared to release another object, which was cataloged as an apogee kick motor but may be a functioning satellite.⁴⁵ Analysis of the orbital data suggests that the two objects got within 10 km of each other.

Research emerged that since 2018, SAST advertised  “orbital mission extension vehicles” that could refuel satellites in GEO.⁴⁶ It advertised what it called an “on-orbit gas station” at the 2018 Zhuhai Air Show.⁴⁷ The customer satellite would need SAST’s refuelling docking port and the refueler would use two robotic arms to connect once it got within two meters.⁴⁸ This refuelling capability is not known to have been demonstrated.

Dual-Use Operational Status

The most likely military utility of the capabilities demonstrated by the SJ-12, SJ-15, SY-7, SJ-17, TJS-3 AKM, TJS-3,  SJ-21, SY-12 01 and 02, and SJ-23 satellites is for on-orbit space situational awareness (SSA) and satellite servicing. Their operational pattern was consistent with slow, methodical, and careful approaches to rendezvous with other space objects in similar orbits. The satellites the SJ-12 and SJ-15 approached were in relatively similar orbits, differing in altitude by a couple of hundred kilometers and slightly in inclination. They did not make huge changes to rendezvous with satellites in significantly different orbits. This behavior is similar to several US RPO missions to test and demonstrate satellite inspection and servicing capabilities such as the XSS-11. Notably, a counterspace assessment released by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in February 2019 stated that China is developing capabilities for inspection, repair, and space debris removal that may also be used as a weapon but did not specifically state that any Chinese RPO activities were a weapons test.⁴⁹

The SJ-17’s approach to Chinasat 5A was not inconsistent with the way other active satellites in the GEO belt relocate to different orbital slots. It is also not unusual for satellites to be co-located within several tens of kilometers to share a GEO slot, although it is rare for them to approach within 1 km as the SJ-17 eventually did. Such a close approach in GEO could be used for very detailed imaging or inspection of another satellite or to intercept radio frequency signals directed at another satellite from Earth. Likely examples of the latter are the activities of the US PAN satellite between 2009 and 2014, and the Russian Luch/Olymp satellite beginning in 2015.

While the known on-orbit activities of the satellites did not include explicit testing of offensive capabilities or aggressive maneuvers, it is possible that the technologies they tested could be used for offensive purposes in the future. One potential offensive use would be to get a radio-frequency jammer close to a satellite, thereby greatly amplifying its ability to interfere with the satellite’s communications. While possible, to date there is no direct public evidence of such systems being tested on orbit, although there have been multiple research articles published in Chinese journals discussing and evaluating the concept.⁵⁰

While some skepticism exists relating Chinese rendezvous and proximity activities with co-orbital ASAT testing, there is no strong publicly available evidence linking these missions and a defined defense program. However, at least one recent Chinese research paper suggests using RPO capabilities to plant small explosive charges in the nozzle of a spacecraft’s engine.⁵¹ To date, China has not conducted any confirmed co-orbital ASAT testing on orbit — only testing of ground-launched direct ascent ASAT weapons.

Endnotes

1. Mark Wade, “Shenzhou 7,” accessed June 30, 2020, http://www.astronautix.com/s/shenzhou7.html; “2019 Annual Report to Congress,” US-China Economic Security Review Commission, accessed June 30, 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2019-annual-report; Brian Weeden, “China’s BX-1 microsatellite: a litmus test for space weaponization,” The Space Review, October 20, 2008, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1.
2. Richard Fisher Jr., “Closer Look: Shenzhou-7’s Close Pass by the International Space Station,” The International Assessment and Strategy Center, October 9, 2008, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.191/pub_detail.asp.
3. “XSS-11 Micro Satellite,” Fact Sheet: Air Force Research Laboratory, Space Vehicles Directorate, current as of September 2011, accessed March 22, 2018, p.1, http://www.kirtland.af.mil/Portals/52/documents/AFD-111103-035.pdf?ver=2016-06-28-110256-797.
4. Mark Wade, “SJ-6,” Astronautix, accessed March 22, 2018, http://www.astronautix.com/s/sj-6.html.
5. Leiying Xu, “China Sends Research Satellite into Space,” Xinhua, updated June 15, 2010. http://english.cri.cn/6909/2010/06/15/1821s576844.htm.
6. A more detailed technical analysis of this event can be found in Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the Dark; The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ06F,” The Space Review, August 30, 2010, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1.
7. Jonathan McDowell, posting on the NASASpaceflight.com forums, July 20, 2013, http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=30486.msg1076481#msg1076481.
8. Due to the uncertainty regarding which payload was which, the public Space Track catalog has not identified which satellite was which. They are still labeled Payload A, Payload B, and Payload C.
9. Marcia Smith, “Surprise Chinese satellite maneuvers mystify western experts,” Space Policy Online, updated August 19, 2013, http://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satellite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/.
10. Marcia Smith, “Did China Succeed in Capturing One of its own Satellites? – Update,” Space Policy Online, updated October 26, 2013, http://spacepolicyonline.com/news/did-china-succeed-in-capturing-one-of-its-own-satellites/.
11. Posting on NASASpaceflight.com forums, June 7, 2016, http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?PHPSESSID=iamdpaq7ig407ooqdmi8gm06k6&topic=30486.msg1545873#msg1545873.
12. Posting on Novosti Kosmonavtiki forums, May 5, 2014, http://novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/forum/messages/forum12/topic13702/message1254275/#message1254275.
13. Posting on Novosti Kosmonavtiki forums, May 29, 2014, http://novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/forum/messages/forum12/topic13702/message1262548/#message1262548.
14. Posting on NASAspaceflight.com forums, June 7, 2016, http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?PHPSESSID=iamdpaq7ig407ooqdmi8gm06k6&topic=30486.msg1545873#msg1545873.
15. “China lands Prototype Crew Spacecraft after inaugural Long March 7 Launch,” Spaceflight101, June 27, 2016, http://spaceflight101. com/long-march-7-maiden-launch/chinalands-prototype-crew-spacecraft-after-inaugural-long-march-7-launch/.
16. “Re-Entry: Aolong-1 Space Debris Removal Demonstrator,” Spaceflight101, August 28, 2016, http://spaceflight101.com/re-entry-aolong-1space-debris-removal-demonstrator/.
17. David Todd, “Two Chinese launches: Long March 11 launches Shiyan-24C trio while Long March 3B puts two Beidou navsats into orbit,” Seradata, December 26, 2023, https://www. seradata.com/two-chinese-launches-longmarch-11-launches-shiyan-24c-trio-while-longmarch-3b-puts-two-beidou-navsats-into-orbit/
18. “SHIJIAN 6 05A (SJ-6 05A), 49961,” Kayhan Space Satcat, accessed February 21, 2025,  https://www.satcat.com/sats/49961; “Space Threat Fact Sheet Annex,” Headquarters Space Force Intelligence, February 21, 2025, https://nssaspace.org/wp-content/ uploads/2025/02/20250221-S2-Space-ThreatFact-Sheet-Annex-v1-RELEASE.pdf.
19. “Space Threat Fact Sheet Annex,” Headquarters Space Force Intelligence, February 21, 2025, https://nssaspace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/20250221-S2-Space-Threat-Fact-Sheet-Annex-v1-RELEASE.pdf.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. “China’s Shijian-17 Satellite settles in  Geostationary Orbit for Experimental Mission,” Spaceflight101, November 24, 2016, http:// spaceflight101.com/cz-5-maiden-flight/shijian-17-settles-in-geostationary-orbit/.
23. Originally, this was reported as Chinasat 6A closing in with Chinasat 5A, due to the U.S. military mislabeling the SJ-17 as Chinasat 6A.
24. “In-Space Eavesdropping? – China’s Shijian-17 completes High-Altitude Link-Up,” Spaceflight101, December 9, 2016, http:// spaceflight101.com/cz-5-maiden-flight/shijian-17-rendezvous-with-chinasat-5a/.
25. Analytical Graphics (@AGItweets), “ComSpOC has detected that #Chinasat 5A has departed SJ-17 & is drifting 0.9 deg/day westward. SJ-17 remains @ 163 deg,” Twitter, December 29, 2016, https://twitter.com/AGItweets/status/814513003798364161.
26. Bob Hall, “Ep16 – Chinasat 1C Space Activities,” Analytical Graphics, Inc, July 2, 2019, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTmRjcac3VE.
27. Ibid.
28. “The Integrity Flash: Analysis of Developments in the Space Domain,” Space Force Association, November 24, 2024, https://isruniversity.com/ wp-content/uploads/2024/12/110-24-Nov2024-Integrity-Flash.pdf.
29. Ibid.
30. “China opens 2017 with obscure communications satellite launch,” Spaceflight101, January 5, 2017, http://spaceflight101.com/long-march-3b-tjs-2-launch/.
31. See discussion of this in the following thread on the NASASpaceflight.com forums: https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index. php?topic=46903.0;all.
32. Ibid.
33. Andrew Jones, “China launches mystery satellite on Long March 7A rocket (photo),” Space.com, November 6, 2023,  https://www.space.com/ china-tjs-10-mystery-satellite-launch.
34. “The Integrity Flash: Analysis of Developments in the Space Domain,” Space Force Association, November 24, 2024, https://isruniversity.com/ wp-content/uploads/2024/12/110-24-Nov2024-Integrity-Flash.pdf.
35. Ibid.
36. Greg Gillinger, email: “Flash Lite (8) UPDATE: Enter TJS-3,” Integrity ISR, January  17, 2025
37. Ibid.
38. Stephen Clark, “China says its launched a space debris mitigation tech demo satellite,” Spaceflight Now, October 25, 2021, https:// spaceflightnow.com/2021/10/25/china-says-ithas-launched-a-space-debris-mitigation-techdemo-satellite/.
39. Andrew Jones, “An object is now alongside China’s Shijian-21 debris mitigation satellite,” SpaceNews, November 5, 2021, https://spacenews. com/an-object-is-now-orbiting-alongside-chinas-shijian-21-debris-mitigation-satellite/.
40. “Orbital Debris Quarterly News,” NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Volume 20, Issue 4, October 2016, https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa. gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/odqnv20i4.pdf.
41. Theresa Hitchens, “China’s SJ-21 ‘tugs’ dead satellite out of GEO belt: Trackers,” Breaking Defense, January 26, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/chinas-sj-21-tugs-dead-satellite-out-of-geo-belt-trackers/.
42. Andrew Jones, “Long March 7A launches classified Shiyan-12 satellites,” SpaceNews, December 23, 2021, https://spacenews.com/long-march7a-launches-classified-shiyan-12-satellites/.
43. Debra Werner, “An In-Orbit Game of Cat and Mouse: CLose approaches prompt calls for communications and norms,” SpaceNews, June 16, 2022, https://spacenews.com/an-in-orbitgame-of-cat-and-mouse-close-approachesprompt-calls-for-communications-and-norms/.
44. Andrew Jones, “Pair of Chinese launches put classified and commercial satellites in orbit,” SpaceNews, January 9, 2023, https://spacenews.com/pair-of-chinese-launches-put-classif ied-and-commercial-satellites-into-orbit/.
45. Andrew Jones, “Classified Chinese satellite releases small object in orbit,” Space.com, January 24, 2023, https://www.space.com/classified-chinese-satellite-shijian-23-releases-subsatellite.
46. Kristin Burke, “PLA On-Orbit Satellite Logistics,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, March 2024, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/ Space/2024-03-18%20PLA%20On-Orbit%20 Satellite%20Logistics.pdf
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,” February 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082341.pdf.
50. David Chen, “Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” Hearing on ‘China’s Advanced Weapons’ Panel on China’s Directed Energy and Electromagnetic Weapons Programs, February 23, 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Chen_Testimony.pdf.
51. Stephen Chen, “Chinese scientists build anti-satellite weapons that can cause explosion inside exhaust,” South China Morning Post, October 21, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3153174/chinese-scientists-build-anti-satellite-weapon-cancause.

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