Verifying Compliance: Constructs to Constrain Counterspace Capabilities
As diplomatic momentum grows around space security and anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) restraints, this report provides a foundational analysis of how compliance with future agreements could be verified, both technically and politically.
Benjamin Silverstein evaluates historical precedents from arms control, disarmament, and environmental agreements to extract five primary verification practices:
- National reporting
- On-site inspections
- National and international technical means
- Third-party data
- Institutional enforcement bodies
The report argues that no single method is sufficient. Instead, a combination of practices, tailored to specific treaty objectives, is essential.
Silverstein details the challenges of verifying compliance with potential bans on:
- Destructive DA-ASAT missile testing
- Co-orbital ASAT systems
- Space environmental damage from intentional fragmentation
Special attention is given to the role of commercial space situational awareness (SSA) providers and their increasingly significant role in detecting and interpreting space behaviors.
The report closes with pragmatic recommendations: states must expand domestic SSA capacity, consider new models for collaborative monitoring, and build verification frameworks that can keep pace with geopolitical, commercial, and technological complexity.
See pages 22–27 for a comparative matrix of arms control verification mechanisms across treaties.
Cites lessons from NPT, CTBT, CWC, CLRTAP, OST, PPWT, and the ASAT moratorium process.
