Reports

Since 2013, Russia has conducted robotic rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), most of which are related to military or intelligence operations. Most of these missions have been publicly acknowledged by the Russian government but few have detailed public information available. None of the programs listed here are thought to involve co-orbital ASAT testing or deployment, but there are still suspicions surrounding several of these events and concerns that some of these programs are intended to develop co-orbital counterspace capabilities.

Russia has long had the potential for a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) capability through its historical ballistic missile defense capabilities and has had DA-ASAT development programs in the past that never became fully operational. In November 2021, after more than a decade of development and testing, Russia successfully demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite. It is unclear whether this system, the Nudol, will become operational soon, and it does not appear to have the capability to threaten targets beyond LEO. Russia is thought to have two other possible DA-ASAT capabilities through 78M6 Kontakt: a Cold War-era air-launched ballistic missile that was designed to be launched from a fighter plane and was rumored to be in active development again; and S-500: a next-generation exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense system, still several years from deployment, that may have capabilities against targets in low LEO orbits.

While the United States does not have an operational, acknowledged direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) system, it does have operational midcourse missile defense interceptors, one of which has been demonstrated in an ASAT role against a satellite in a very low orbit. The United States has developed dedicated DA-ASATs in the past, both conventional and nuclear-tipped, and likely possesses the ability to do so in the near future should it choose so.

The United States conducted one co-orbital intercept test in 1986 with the Delta 180 experiment as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The United States has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and rendezvous in both low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Orbit (GEO), along with tracking, targeting, and hit-to-kill (HTK) intercept technologies that could lead to a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. These tests and demonstrations were conducted for other non-offensive missions, such as missile defense, on-orbit inspections, and satellite servicing, and the United States does not have an acknowledged program to develop co-orbital capabilities. However, the United States possesses the technological capability to develop a co-orbital capability in a short period of time if it chooses to. If the United States moves ahead with its planned Golden Dome missile defense architecture, the space-based interceptors that would be part of such a program could provide a co-orbital capability.

The X-37B OTV is a technology demonstrator and experimental vehicle which is likely used for testing reusable space launch vehicle technologies, such as guidance and thermal protection, and on-orbit testing of new sensor technologies and satellite hardware for risk reduction. The X-37B has also deployed small satellites. While it does have some potential capability for orbital inspection, repair, and retrieval, it is unlikely to perform these functions given its limited payload bay. It has near-zero feasibility as an orbital weapons system for attacking targets on the ground.

This fact sheet outlines U.S. military and intelligence use of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in Earth orbit for surveillance, inspection, and situational awareness missions—without direct evidence of weaponization.