Publications

Secure World Foundation’s response to the ESAS 2028–2037 Decadal Survey calls for sustained observation of the atmospheric effects of spacecraft re-entry. The paper examines growing inputs of spacecraft-derived metals and aerosols, remaining research gaps, and the role of space weather in shaping re-entry rates.

SWF's August 2026 Newsletter

For this August 2026 thought leadership piece, Secure World Foundation examines lessons from the first dialogue in a two-year series bringing together experts from nuclear policy, space security, and commercial space. The discussion highlights how stronger communication, transparency, and cross-sector engagement can help manage escalation risks and strengthen international stability as these fields become increasingly interconnected.

The 2025 Annual Report

SWF's July 2026 Newsletter

This Insight examines the pressures facing UN COPUOS as geopolitical tensions, rapid membership growth, and the UN liquidity crisis complicate its consensus-based work. It reviews the 69th session’s limited progress and considers reforms that could help the Committee remain effective while preserving multilingualism, inclusive participation, and consensus decision-making.

Secure World Foundation’s filing on Cowboy Space’s orbital data center application urges the FCC to treat the proposal as a precedent-setting request that needs closer scrutiny. The filing calls for system-level risk analysis, phased authorization, and updated standards for evaluating very large satellite constellations.

Secure World Foundation outlines practical transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities that can reduce mistrust, clarify intentions, and support regional and global stability.

SWF's June 2026 Newsletter

Secure World Foundation outlines practical transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities, with a focus on reducing mistrust, improving stability, and supporting future space security agreements.

The Portuguese translation of Responsible Investment in the Space Sector, which explains how stewardship, risk management, and responsible behavior in space operations protect long-term value in the growing space economy.

China’s “reusable experimental spacecraft” (Chongfu Shiyong Shiyan Hangtian Qi, or CSSHQ) is a technology demonstrator and experimental vehicle which is likely used for testing reusable space launch vehicle technologies, as well as on-orbit testing of new sensor technologies and satellite hardware for risk reduction. The CSSHQ has deployed a small satellite during each of its first three missions. It has demonstrated limited rendezvous and proximity operations with the satellites that it has released during its missions, but the spaceplane has near-zero feasibility as an orbital weapons system for attacking targets on the ground.

Since 2010, Russia has been testing technologies for rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) that could lead to or support a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, and some of those efforts have links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program. Additional evidence suggests Russia may have started a new co-orbital ASAT program called Burevestnik, potentially supported by a surveillance and tracking program called Nivelir. The technologies developed by these programs could also be used for non-aggressive applications, including surveilling and inspecting foreign satellites, and most of the on-orbit RPO activities done to date match these missions. However, Russia has deployed two “sub-satellites” at high velocity, which suggests at least some of their LEO RPO activities are of a weapons nature.

Over the last decade, India has shifted from a purely civil space program to one that includes military capabilities.

Since 2008, China has conducted multiple tests of satellite technologies for robotic rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) to support surveillance and inspection of other space objects in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), most of which are related to military or intelligence operations. While these missions have been publicly acknowledged by China, most have few public details and a few remain shrouded in secrecy. None of the programs listed here have strong evidence to link them to co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) testing or deployment.

China has at least one, and possibly as many as three, programs underway to develop direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) capabilities, either as dedicated counterspace systems or as midcourse missile defense systems that could also provide counterspace capabilities. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against LEO targets is likely mature and potentially operationally fielded on mobile launchers. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against deep space targets (MEO and GEO) is likely still in the experimental or development phase, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether it will become an operational capability in the near future. Since 2005, China has conducted over a dozen tests of DA-ASAT capabilities, although only one, conducted on January 11, 2007, resulted in the creation of long-lived orbital debris.

Since 2013, Russia has conducted robotic rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), most of which are related to military or intelligence operations. Most of these missions have been publicly acknowledged by the Russian government but few have detailed public information available. None of the programs listed here are thought to involve co-orbital ASAT testing or deployment, but there are still suspicions surrounding several of these events and concerns that some of these programs are intended to develop co-orbital counterspace capabilities.

Russia has long had the potential for a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) capability through its historical ballistic missile defense capabilities and has had DA-ASAT development programs in the past that never became fully operational. In November 2021, after more than a decade of development and testing, Russia successfully demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite. It is unclear whether this system, the Nudol, will become operational soon, and it does not appear to have the capability to threaten targets beyond LEO. Russia is thought to have two other possible DA-ASAT capabilities through 78M6 Kontakt: a Cold War-era air-launched ballistic missile that was designed to be launched from a fighter plane and was rumored to be in active development again; and S-500: a next-generation exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense system, still several years from deployment, that may have capabilities against targets in low LEO orbits.